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There is a textual crux that erupts, stark and disturbing, at the very 
opening of Primo Levi’s entire, extraordinary oeuvre, and which 
taints with a certain note of doubt and instability all the magisterial 
lucidity that follows. In that crux lies the seeds of a vision of evil in 
Levi as an insidious form of “near enemy” of humanity, starkly dis-
tinct from any idea of radical evil. 
Levi’s first great work of reflection on the physics and the ethics of 
the Holocaust, Se questo è un uomo (If This is a Man, 1947/1958),1 estab-
lishes a perspective on genocide which is ostensibly one of detached 
analysis and experimental demonstration: he sets out to add nothing, 
as he says in his Preface, to the “atrocious details” (“particolari atro-
ci”)2 that, already in 1947, he assumes are all too well known to his 
readers, indeed to readers across the world. Instead, his much-quoted 
aim is to offer “documents for a calm study of the human mind” 
(“uno studio pacato”);3 even today, seventy years on from his depor-
tation, the very idea of such a reflective mode is astonishing. And for 
many of his most intensely loyal readers, it is the analytical, eviden-
tial, anthropological, experimental eye this precept opens up that al-
lows Levi to pinpoint the horror of what he describes and of what he 
lived through, without loss of dignity or voice, against the oblivion 
the Nazis had planned for him and for the Jews of Europe. 
1  Texts are given in Italian and in English (my own translations). 
2  Primo Levi, Opere, 2 vol., Turin, Einaudi, 1997, vol. 1, p. 5. 
3  Ibidem. 
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For the same reason, there is little or no space for a theodicy of 
Auschwitz in the secular, rationalist modeller that Primo Levi em-
bodies in textual-testimonial form, in his programmatic passage from 
darkness towards light, which is declaredly not to be taken as a pas-
sage from evil to good, but rather from chaos and indecipherability 
towards understanding and knowledge, a new Aufklärung. To bor-
row one of his characteristically ironic and light plays on words – in 
this case from a chapter title of Se questo – Levi’s Auschwitz ostensi-
bly exists “On This Side of Good and Evil” (“Al di qua del bene e del 
male”),4 in a universe of messy human degradation where such blunt 
categories are at least blurred and quite possibly useless as categories 
of explanation. If anything, it is social and animal evolution – good 
and bad adaptation – that replaces Manicheistic struggle in Levi’s con-
centration camp universe, as the once-again heavily ironic chapter 
and later book title “The Drowned and the Saved” (“I sommersi e i 
salvati”) is surely intended to illustrate. Radical evil – or in indeed 
absolute good – are both irrelevancies, points of impossible infinitude 
in Levi’s universe of finites and impurities. Here he is in a telling and 
highly characteristic series of passages, from Se questo and then from 
the essay “The Grey Zone” (“La zona grigia”) in I sommersi e i salvati 
(1986), reflecting on the figure of the “saint”, a figure that clearly 
troubled him as a token of the non-human, the impossible and in-
deed the undesirable reign of the absolute – here absolute goodness: 
 
Moltissime sono state le vie da noi escogitate e attuate per non morire: 
tante quanti sono i caratteri umani. Tutte comportano una lotta este-
nuante di ciascuno contro tutti, e molte una somma non piccola di 
aberrazioni e di compromessi. Il sopravvivere senza aver rinunciato a 
nulla del proprio mondo morale, a meno di potenti e diretti interventi 
della fortuna, non è stato concesso che a pochissimi individui superio-
ri, della stoffa dei martiri e dei santi.5 
4  Ivi, vol. 1, p. 73-82. 
5  “The ways we all thought out and put into practice to cheat death were legion: as 
numerous as there are different human personalities. They all bring with them a 
draining struggle of all against all, and many also bring a not inconsiderable 
degree of aberration and compromise. Survival without having to deny even the 
smallest part of one’s moral world, except in cases of powerful and direct strokes 
of good fortune, was a gift given to only a tiny handful of higher beings, made of 
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È ingenuo, assurdo e storicamente falso ritenere che un sistema infero, 
qual era il nazionalsocialismo, santifichi le sue vittime: al contrario, 
esso le degrada, le assimila a sé.6  
 
Non esiste proporzionalità tra la pietà che proviamo e l’estensione del 
dolore da cui la pietà è suscitata: una singola Anna Frank desta più 
commozione delle miriadi che soffrirono come lei, ma la cui immagi-
ne è rimasta in ombra. Forse è necessario che sia così; se dovessimo e 
potessimo soffrire le sofferenze di tutti, non potremmo vivere. Forse 
solo ai santi è concesso il terribile dono della pietà verso i molti; ai 
monatti, a quelli della Squadra Speciale, ed a noi tutti, non resta, nel 
migliore dei casi, che la pietà saltuaria indirizzata al singolo, al Mit-
mensch, al co-uomo: all’essere umano di carne e sangue che sta da-
vanti a noi, alla portata dei nostri sensi provvidenzialmente miopi.7 
 
For Levi in these passages, the saint or the sanctified human being, is 
a figure of power but also deep ambiguity: to read human experience 
through the lens of the saintly is a profoundly mismatched heuristic, 
a discourse of purity, of holistic (holy) vision and bottomless capaci-
ty, none of which is consonant with the human. 
The same goes for radical evil, indeed for all absolutes and ex-
tremes: our human nature is, simply, the enemy of all that is infinite 
(“[la] nostra condizione umana, che è nemica di ogni infinito”).8 
Any yet, and yet… There are cracks in this edifice, in the calm 
model of moderate experience of terrifying extremes, moments of 
the stuff of martyrs and saints.” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 88. 
6  “It is naive, foolish and historically false to believe that an infernal system such as 
National Socialism sanctifies its victims. On the contrary, it degrades them, it 
remakes them in its own image.” Ivi, vol. 2, p. 1020. 
7  “There is no proportionate relation between the pity we feel and the extent of the 
suffering which causes that pity: a single Anne Frank moves us more than the 
myriads of others who suffered like her but whose image has stayed in the 
shadows. Perhaps it has to be like this: if we were to, if we could suffer the pain of 
all others, we could not live. Perhaps only saints are given the terrible gift of pity 
for the many; for the gravediggers [the reference is to Manzoni’s I promessi sposi, 
1842], for the Sonderkommandos, and for all of us, the best we can hope for is 
occasional pity towards a single individual, towards the Mitmensch, or fellow-
human: the human being in flesh and blood who stands before us, present to our 
senses in all their providential myopia.” Ivi, vol. 2, p. 1033-1034. 
8  Ivi, vol. 1, p. 11. 
                                                                                                                      
62 LA LETTERATURA E IL MALE 
exception and deep instability in Levi that open a door onto a terrain 
where a certain form of good and evil, if not a theodicy, nevertheless 
pertains, inhabiting a human, if not an absolute space, a relational ra-
ther than a radical space, a “third” or “grey” space between conven-
tional moral binaries. Berel Lang, in his recent biographical essay on 
Levi, provides some remarkably potent suggestions for reading Le-
vi’s moral imagination in this light, including several pages on Levi’s 
implicit notions of evil and of justice.9 Lang departs precisely from 
the influential and not a little ambiguous pages of the essay “The 
Grey Zone”.10 Lang’s argument, and it proves powerfully pertinent 
here, is that for Levi, evil remained a contradictory puzzle, a paradox 
that was both open to and beyond explanation, both utilitarian and, 
as he called it in I sommersi, “useless”.11 This space of irreducible con-
tradiction in evil and indeed good (akin to Isaiah Berlin’s liberalism) 
opens up a profoundly innovative category, the grey zone, a position 
that is, precisely what Lang calls a “third modality of ethical judge-
ment”,12 not to be misconstrued as merely a halfway-house between 
the two poles of “good” and “evil”, of white and black, a little dose of 
one with the mitigating juice of the other (or vice versa). Instead, 
Lang posits, the grey zone is “its own autonomous domain: separate, 
yet still within the compass of ethical judgement”.13 For Lang, this 
places Levi’s moral centre and focus beyond good and evil,14 but we 
can slightly adjust this formulation to suggest that within the widely 
encompassing and irreducibly complex grey zone, there are elements 
of a “tertiary” human evil we are tracing here. 
And so to that textual crux mentioned above, where a shadow of 
human evil is thrown across the blank canvas of Levi’s work.  It 
comes not in the Preface to Se questo è un uomo, but in another ele-
ment in its paratextual apparatus, the poem-epigraph, later entitled 
“Shemà”, built around the Torah prayer known by that name and 
9  Berel Lang, Primo Levi. The Matter of a Life, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2014. 
10  Ivi, p. 121-130. 
11  P. Levi, Opere, cit., vol. 2, p. 1073-1090. 
12  B. Lang, Primo Levi. The Matter of a Life, cit., p. 129. 
13  Ivi, p. 128. 
14  Ivi, p. 129. 
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incipit.15 The very first crack in Levi’s edifice of “calm study”, in oth-
er words, precedes the edifice itself; its foundations are already frac-
tured, we might say, and they are marked by a point where the voice 
of the oath and the curse burst in on the Levian scene. 
The poem is rightly famous for its lapidary declaration of the lim-
it-state of manhood and of womanhood, of human identity and dig-
nity in Auschwitz; this is Levi’s Ecce homo, with its imploring impera-
tive or petition to the reader to Consider (“Considerate”) these 
victims-creatures-men/women, to “Meditate that this has been” (“Medi-
tate che questo è stato”) – an appeal to history and ontology simulta-
neously – and to remember and transmit this knowledge.16 But often 
glossed over and left uncomfortably hanging at the end of “Shemà” 
by many of its readers are its last three lines, the violent Biblical curs-
es thrown down upon those readers who wilfully fail to “consider”, 
to “meditate”, to remember and transmit. The final tercet is intro-
duced by a conjunction of simple but apocalyptic power, “Or” (“Or 
else…”):  
 
… 
O vi si sfaccia la casa, 
La malattia vi impedisca, 
I vostri nati torcano il viso da voi.17 
  
15  The poem is dated 10 January 1946 and appeared without its title in Se questo è un 
uomo, but with the title in Levi’s later collections of poetry (ivi, vol. 2, p. 525). It 
was variously placed after and before the Preface in the 1947 and 1958 editions, 
without title. Before even the first edition, it had been published in a local anti-
Fascist journal in 1947, where Levi was publishing several stories that fed into Se 
questo è un uomo, with the alternative Biblical title “Salmo” (“Psalm”); see notes at 
Opere, cit., vol. 1, p. 1382; vol. 2, p. 1543. 
16  Some recent work that comments on the poem includes: Uri Cohen, Consider If This 
Is a Man: Primo Levi and the Figure of Ulysses, «Jewish Social Studies: History, 
Culture, Society», XVIII, 2 (Winter 2012), p. 40–69; Jonathan Druker, Ethics and 
Ontology in Primo Levi’s «Survivial in Auschwitz»: A Levinasian Reading, «Italica», 
LXXXIII, 3/4 (Fall – Winter 2006), p. 529-542; Nancy Harrowitz, Primo Levi’s Jewish 
Identity, in Cambridge Companion to Primo Levi, ed. By Robert S. C. Gordon, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 17-31. 
17  “Or may your home crumble, / May sickness impede you, / May your children 
turn their faces from you.” P. Levi, Opere, cit., vol. 1, p. 3. 
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This remains one of the most remarkable, and most opaque, turns in 
Levi’s work, one so shocking as to require deep reflection that, to 
my knowledge, has thus far been missing from the critical field. The 
source, as for the whole poem, is clear: the text of Deuteronomy, from 
which not only the Shema prayer is taken, on which Levi bases this 
foundational poem for all testimonial discourse after the Holocaust, 
but also the covenant of the Jewish people with God, the binding dec-
laration of obedience and the subsequent curses of disobedience. The 
three lines that close the poem echo the litany of curses, especially in 
Deuteronomy 28: 15-68, which begin thus: 
 
 But it shall come to pass, if you do not obey the voice of the LORD 
your God, to observe carefully all His commandments and His stat-
utes which I command you today, that all these curses will come upon 
you and overtake you. (Deut. 28: 15, New King James version) 
 
If the source is clear, the impact of this final congedo of Levi’s poem is 
by no means exhausted by its source: Levi is as far from pastiche in 
this poem as could possibly be imagined, and the source captures lit-
tle of the deep moral jeopardy of these lines for 20th-century concep-
tions of morality. Why this awesome violence towards the reader, 
this curse of disobedience following the imperatives, this dark loom-
ing threat left hovering over “you” / “us”?  And why, particularly – 
and here the instability and potential for confusion in a lyric panorama 
of evil is intense – why all this, in a poem that makes no mention what-
soever of the perpetrators, but rather only of victims and readers, of 
third and of second persons (and a shadowy enunciating subject or first 
person)? The answers to these questions and the enigma of Levi’s curs-
es open a door onto the residual terrain of human evil in Primo Levi. 
Giorgio Agamben has written extensively (and for some, rather 
distortingly) of Levi, in Quel che resta di Auschwitz (Remnants of 
Auschwitz) and elsewhere.18 But one of the books in the Homo Sacer 
series that does not touch on Levi at all can perhaps illuminate our 
18  For examples of critiques of Agamben, with a particular emphasis on his (mis-)use 
of Levi, see Dominick LaCapra, Approaching Limit Events: Siting Agamben, in History 
in Transit. Experience, Identity, Critical Theory, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004, 
p. 144-194; Lisa Guenther, Resisting Agamben: The Biopolitics of Shame and 
Humiliation, «Philosophy and Social Criticism», XXXVIII, 1 (January 2012), p. 59-79. 
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analysis here. In Il sacramento del linguaggio, Agamben explains that the 
oath, in both legal and religious terms, is that which renders sacred – in 
Agamben’s perception, both holy and accursed, or apart – through lan-
guage.19 Through this nexus, as Laura Moudarres has explained, the per-
formance of the oath binds together words and deeds, actions and con-
sequences.20 As I “swear” that I will act in a certain way, I thereby 
already enact, predicting and determining the action itself (“Or else…”, 
“if I do not, then…”). The performance of the contrary curse of the po-
tential perjurer (“If I should break my oath, then may…”), the self-
destruction of s/he who fails to respect that declared bond, is above all 
marked by its reflexivity: “giurare equivale innanzitutto a maledire, a male-
dirsi nel caso che si dica il falso o non si mantenga ciò che si è promesso.”21 
Levi’s combination of imperative and curse in “Shemà” shares 
something of both the collective and reflexive in Agameben’s oath: 
like the latter, it is constitutive of a polis and of a law – here the law 
of testimony or more capaciously, a law demanding the acknowl-
edgement of human suffering, as much as the knowledge of it, which 
Levi inaugurates through language in this very declamation. The law 
in “Shemà” – and indeed in aspects of Agamben’s account also – 
comes less in the form of legislation, however, than in the form of a 
contract. The poem binds us to certain actions and sets down the 
penalty clauses for derogation of the contract, in its language of col-
lapse, impediment, of torque, à rebours, “against nature”: “si sfaccia” 
is literally “undone”; “impedisca”, “impede”; “torcano”, literally “twist”. 
It is this counterpoint to Levi’s polis or law of human acknowledge-
ment, this shattering of the contract and the consequent anathemas, 
which the final three lines of the poem declare and which, I suggest, 
amounts to Levi’s first vision of human evil in this civic polis, an evil 
which, as I shall argue, which we might usefully label “indifference”. 
We shall see below the contractarian consequence of this torque. 
If the tone of “Shemà”’s ritual and contractual curses is all but 
missing from the remainder of Se questo è un uomo, the motifs of the 
home, of illness and crucially also of the look, the face and the turn 
19  Giorgio Agamben, Il sacramento del linguaggio. Archeologia del giuramento, Bari-
Roma, Laterza, 2008. 
20  Laura Moudarres, Sacrament of Testimony: Agamben and Biblical Language in Primo 
Levi’s Se questo è un uomo, «The Italianist», XXXIV, 1 (February 2014), p. 88-102. 
21  G. Agamben, Il sacramento del linguaggio. Archeologia del giuramento, cit., p. 42. 
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on which the curses are built, all return to make up some of its core 
constitutive elements, some of the fundamental vessels of Levi’s 
troubled, probing ethical reflections. 
In particular, as I’ve argued elsewhere,22 the look is a key vessel 
for Levi. He seems to operate ethically in something of a Levinasian 
universe in which the acknowledgement and recognition of the other, 
in particular acknowledging the “otherness” of the other, marks the 
entry in the realm of the ethical, what Levinas calls the “face-to-face” 
– and conversely, the denial of that acknowledgement marks the exit 
from human reciprocity into something else, a refusal of the human 
that amounts to something like “evil”. 
Beyond the sheer physical degradation and suffering, one of the 
earliest and repeated traumas of arrival at Auschwitz for Levi came 
in the form of the looks denied, the questions unanswered. And even 
as he becomes bluntly inured later on to these blows and humilia-
tions, both metaphorical and literal, the trauma of the look denied, 
the turning of blind eyes and deaf ears returns at key moments of an-
guish and recognition, typically moments of transition and memory 
that briefly take him out of the fog of hunger, cold and the raw strug-
gle for survival. Three key examples, taking place at three important 
sites within the Auschwitz camp system, make the point powerfully. 
It is telling that the sites – the hospital, the office and the lab – are 
three interior and transitional spaces, as well as perverted forms of 
three spaces and institutions of modernity, and each brings Levi what 
he later called “moments of reprieve”, as well as contact with outsid-
ers/bystanders and so also humiliation, in a rare kind of mirroring, as 
he sees himself as they see him. 
First, in the Monowitz camp clinic, the KB or “Ka-Be”, Levi asks 
his neighbour, a Polish inmate patient for help: 
 
Lui si è voltato all’infermiere, che gli somiglia come un gemello e sta in 
un angolo a fumare; hanno parlato e riso insieme senza rispondere, 
come se io non ci fossi: poi uno di loro mi ha preso il braccio e ha guar-
dato il numero, e allora hanno riso più forte. […] 
22  See Robert Gordon, Primo Levi’s Ordinary Virtues. From Testimony to Ethics, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 39-54, on which I have drawn in part here; and 
cfr. J. Druker, Ethics and Ontology in Primo Levi’s «Survivial in Auschwitz»: A 
Levinasian Reading, cit. 
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L’infermiere indica all’altro le mie costole, come se io fossi un cadavere in sa-
la anatomica; accenna alle palpebre e alle guance gonfie e al collo sottile, 
si curva e preme coll’indice sulla mia tibia e fa notare all’altro la profonda 
incavatura che il dito lascia nella carne pallida, come nella cera. 
Vorrei non aver mai rivolto la parola al polacco: mi pare di non avere mai, 
in tutta la mia vita, subito un affronto più atroce di questo. […] si rivol-
ge a me, e in quasi-tedesco, caritatevolmente, me ne fornisce il com-
pendio:  “– Du Jude kaputt.”23 
 
As the terms highlighted indicate, the affront, the insult and the pre-
sent reaction of disgust (“I wish” is poised between a historical pre-
sent-tense of Levi’s sensations in the “Ka-Be” and the vaster present 
human regret of this encounter with (inhumane) human evil) is liter-
ally embodied in the turns and the looks that render Levi invisible, 
dead. 
A reprise of this charged encounter of the ordinary and the per-
verse permeates one of the most quoted and intense episodes of Se 
questo è un uomo, Levi’s encounter with Pannwitz, the Nazi doctor 
who tests Levi’s chemistry as a condition of his entry into the Buna 
laboratory (a test that will save Levi from weeks of the Polish winter 
and so save his life). Here too, we are confronted with a perversion of 
a dynamic of human enquiry, in this case the specific “scene” of the 
school or university oral examination, the “interrogation” of a stu-
dent by a professor. On top of ethical enquiry, then, we find here, as 
often in Levi’s ethics, a form of pedagogical exchange. And once 
again, the perversion of the look is at the very core of the offence: 
23  “He turned to the nurse, who looked rather like his twin standing in a corner 
smoking; they spoke and laughed together without replying, as if I were not there. 
Then one of them took me by the arm and looked at my number and they let out 
an even louder laugh. […] The nurse points my ribs out to the other, as if I were a 
corpse in an anatomy theatre; he mentions my eyelids and my swollen cheeks and 
thin neck, he bends down and presses my tibia with his index finger and points 
out the deep dent his finger leaves in my pale flesh, like in wax. I wish I had never 
spoken a word to the Pole: I don’t think I have ever been so insulted in all my life. […] 
he turns to me, in his almost-German, and charitably offers his summing up: ‘Du 
Jude kaputt’.” P. Levi, Opere, cit., vol. 1, p. 42-43. Emphases added. 
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Quando ebbe finito di scrivere, alzò gli occhi e mi guardò. 
Da quel giorno, io ho pensato al Doktor Pannwitz molte volte e in 
molti modi. Mi sono domandato quale fosse il suo intimo funziona-
mento di uomo. […] Soprattutto, quando io sono stato di nuovo un 
uomo libero, ho desiderato di incontrarlo ancora, e non già per ven-
detta, ma solo per una mia curiosità umana.  
Perché quello sguardo non corse fra due uomini; e se io sapessi spiegare 
a fondo la natura di quello sguardo, scambiato come attraverso la pare-
te di vetro di un acquario tra due esseri che abitano mezzi diversi, 
avrei anche spiegato l’essenza della grande follia della terza Germania.24 
 
The figure of Levi is here something other than human, just as he 
rendered a corpse in the “Ka-Be”; but so too, in the perverse refusal 
to recognise the human in him, is the look of Pannwitz. Conversely, 
the voice of Levi the survivor who wishes to encounter Pannwitz 
again, to look him in the eye, in order to plumb the depths of folly of 
the Third Reich, is a voice of salvaged humanity and ethical enquiry.  
Shortly after this look / non-look comes a rare moment of flashing 
anger akin to the curses of “Shemà”, a moment of righteous “judge-
ment” (something Levi elsewhere tends to refuse, pleading impotentia 
judicandi).25 This is the moment of Alex, the Kapo, wiping his hand on 
Levi’s shoulder: 
 
Senza odio e senza scherno, Alex strofina la mano sulla mia spalla, il 
palmo e il dorso, per nettarla, e sarebbe assai stupito, l’innocente bru-
to Alex, se qualcuno gli dicesse che alla stregua di questo suo atto io 
oggi lo giudico, lui e Pannwitz e gli innumerevoli che furono come 
lui, grandi e piccoli, in Auschwitz e ovunque.26 
24  “When he had finished writing, he looked up and stared at me. From that day, I have 
thought of Dr Pannwitz many times and in many different ways. I have wondered 
about his innermost workings as a man […] above all, once I had regained my 
freedom, I wished to meet him again, not for revenge but just out of human 
curiosity. Because that look did not run from one man to another; and if I could get 
to the bottom of that look, exchanged as if across the glass of an aquarium between 
two beings living in two different worlds, I would have found also the essence of the 
great folly of the Third Germany.” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 101-102. Emphases added. 
25  Cfr. ivi, vol. 2, p. 1037. 
26  “Without hatred or disgust, Alex wipes his hand on my shoulder, first the palm 
then the back, to clean it off, and he would be astonished, the innocent, brutish 
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Like the Pole in the infirmary looking at his body parts as a prelude 
to looking through him as if he is not there, Alex wipes hand to 
shoulder, with no face-to-face, no look, no turn and thus no dynamic 
of engagement or human acknowledgement of any kind. Levi’s judg-
es, condemns, sees a profound evil here. 
In the Buna laboratory, finally, we find the same dynamic once 
again: this time with civilian outsiders, from normal world, young 
German, Polish and Ukrainian women. And once again, it is the re-
jected question, the turn away and the denied look that embodies 
their inhumane ignorance: 
 
Di fronte alle ragazze del laboratorio, noi tre ci sentiamo sprofondare 
di vergogna e di imbarazzo. Noi sappiamo qual è il nostro aspetto: ci ve-
diamo l’un l’altro, e talora ci accade di specchiarci in un vetro terso. Sia-
mo ridicoli e ripugnanti. Il nostro cranio è calvo il lunedì, e coperto di 
una corta muffa brunastra il sabato. Abbiamo il viso gonfio e giallo, 
segnato in permanenza dai tagli del barbiere frettoloso, e spesso da li-
vidure e piaghe torpide.27 
 
Una volta ho chiesto una informazione a Fräulein Liczba, e lei non mi 
ha risposto, ma si è volta a Stawinoga con viso infastidito e gli ha parlato 
rapidamente. Non ho inteso la frase ma ‘Stinkjude’ l’ho percepito 
chiaramente, e mi si sono strette le vene.28 
 
It is no coincidence that there is something of a crescendo in each these 
cases, the turning away and the contemptuous rejection of mutual 
Alex, if someone were to tell him that today, for this act of his, I judge Alex, Alex 
and Pannwitz and all those like him, the great and the small, in Auschwitz and 
wherever else they may be.” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 103-104. 
27  “Before the laboratory girls, the three of us felt ourselves submerged in shame and 
embarassment. We know what we look like: we see each other and sometimes we 
catch a reflection of ourselves in a clear glass. We are ridiculous and repugnant. Our 
skulls are bald on Mondays and covered with a brownish, short mould by 
Saturday. Our faces are swollen and yellow, permanently scarred by the marks of 
the hasty barber and often also with hardened bruises and wounds.” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 
138. Emphases added. 
28  “Once I asked Fräulein Liczba about something, and she did not reply, turning 
instead to Stawinoga with an irritated look and saying something quickly. I didn’t 
catch the sentence in full, but I clearly heard the word ‘Stinkjude’, and my blood 
froze.” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 139. Emphases added. 
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reciprocity bringing with them a touch of the aura, the dynamic and 
the force of the malediction that ends “Shemà”. This seems especially 
to be the case as each scene spills over from a double staging – what 
in the language of cinematography would be called a two-shot or in 
Levinasian terms a “face-to-face” (Levi to the Polish patient-
neighbour in the “Ka-Be”; Levi to Pannwitz; Levi to Fräulein Liczba) 
– into a three-shot or a more complex triangle of looks, turns, turn-
ings away and gestures: Levi asks the Pole who turns away to ad-
dress the nurse; Levi is interrogated by Pannwitz and is then escorted 
away by Alex, who in turn does not look but “uses” Levi as a rag; 
Levi asks Fräulein Liczba, who turns away towards Stawinoga. In 
each of these cases, Levi is ejected from an axial face-to-face, and the 
turn propels him into a marginal, reduced position, a position of in-
visibility, even of phantasmal death, in a violently exclusionary dou-
ble-take. He is pushed off-centre, thrust to one side: and, crucially, his 
look, the moral look of the witness and the judge, is a look that comes 
from that one side, oblique and devastating. (Alex, he says, would be 
stunned to receive judgement from there – just as we readers were 
similarly shocked to see the dark shadow of judgement erupt in the 
curses at the end of “Shemà”). The judgement of human evil comes 
from the sort of self or reflexive mirroring made possible by the dy-
namic that moves from the two-shot to the three-shot: he sees himself 
as he is seen, judged, assessed, insulted.  
This complex, deflected and oblique mirroring recalls nothing so 
much as the myth of Perseus and the Gorgon that Levi evokes so power-
fully forty years after Se questo è un uomo in I sommersi e i salvati. There, at 
stake is the precarious, flawed status of all survivors, all witnesses:  
 
[N]oi sopravvissuti siamo una minoranza anomala oltre che esigua: 
siamo quelli che, per loro prevaricazione o abilità o fortuna, non han-
no toccato il fondo. Chi lo ha fatto, chi ha visto la Gorgone, non è tor-
nato per raccontare, o è tornato muto; ma sono loro, i “mussulmani”, i 
sommersi, i testimoni integrali, coloro la cui deposizione avrebbe avu-
to significato generale. Loro sono la regola, noi l’eccezione.29 
29  “We the survivors are not the true witnesses […] We are a small, anomalous 
minority […] whoever looked at the Gorgon’s head did not come back to tell the 
tale, or they came back dumb; but it is they , the ‘Muselmänner’, the drowned, the 
fully fledged witnesses, whose evidence would have hold as generally true. They 
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For Levi the survivor is the one who has looked upon death, upon 
human evil, but only obliquely, indirectly, like Perseus, through a 
mirror, through a glass darkly. Or as Levi puts it a few lines later, in 
place of others, as their proxy, their delegate, as a “third party”: “noi 
toccati dalla sorte abbiamo cercato, con maggiore o minore sapienza, 
di raccontare non solo il nostro destino, ma anche quello degli altri, 
dei sommersi, appunto; ma è stato un discorso ‘per conto di terzi’… 
Parliamo noi in loro vece, per delega.”30 This is perhaps the closest 
Levi comes to articulating what is staged in those encounters with 
forms everyday human evil, in everyday modern spaces transplanted 
to an horrific “other” place - in the clinic, the office, the lab – the “ter-
tiary” spaces where human good and human evil inhere. 
Mention of the Muselmänner is crucial here, because the figure of 
the Muselmann is revealed in Se questo è un uomo as the trait d’union 
between that whole cluster of motifs that circle around the look, the 
face and the turn, and the potential for rupture in each of these. The 
Muselmann stakes out a new territory for a human, contingent, fero-
cious, consequentialist evil:  
 
Sono loro, i Musulmänner, i sommersi, il nerbo del campo; loro, la 
massa anonima, continuamente rinnovata e sempre identica, dei non-
uomini che marciano e faticano in silenzio, spenta in loro la scintilla 
divina, già troppo vuoti per soffrire veramente. Si esita a chiamarli vi-
vi: si esita a chiamar morte la loro morte, davanti a cui essi non temo-
no perché sono troppo stanchi per comprenderla. Essi popolano la 
mia memoria della loro presenza senza volto, e se potessi racchiudere 
in una immagine tutto il male del nostro tempo, sceglierei questa im-
magine, che mi è familiare: un uomo scarno, dalla fronte china e dalle 
spalle curve, sul cui volto e nei cui occhi non si possa leggere traccia 
di pensiero.31 
are the rule, we are the exception.” Ivi, vol. 2, p. 1056. 
30  “We who were touched by ill-fate have tried, with more or less wisdom, to relate 
not only our destiny but also that of the others, the drowned, precisely; but it has 
been a ‘third-party’ report […] we speak in their stead, by proxy.” Ivi, vol. 2, p. 
1057. 
31  “The Muselmänner, the drowned, they are the heart of the camp; them, the 
anonymous mass, always changing and always the same, of non-humans who 
march and struggle in silence, bereft of all divine spark, already too empty really 
to suffer. It is hard to call them living, hard to call their death a true death; they do 
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Levi does something quite remarkable here – and Agamben was un-
derstandably fascinated by it: Levi takes as his emblem of evil, “the 
image of all the evil of our time”, not the enactment or embodiment 
of evil in the figure of the agent of death or the perpetrator, but rather 
its other embodiment in the consequence of torture and violence, its 
embodiment in the empty face, the faceless face (“la loro presenza sen-
za volto”), somewhere on the edge of the human, in the emptied-out 
humanity of the victim. 
Evil is present, in the loss of the look, the loss of human contact. 
The empty look of the Muselmann echoes the refusal of the look in 
Pannwitz, Alex, Liczba, the Pole, creating a converse image of evil – 
not radical evil, not theological, but evil historically enacted (the evil 
of our time), born of the truncated human reciprocity of the face-to-
face, inflicted or chosen. 
In this re-vectoring of evil, the key figure, the test case – flagged 
up through its mirroring in the figure of the Muselmann – is in fact 
neither the perpetrator, nor the victim or first-hand eye-witnesses, 
but – to recall a taxonomy made famous by Raul Hilberg – the by-
stander, the ordinary Germans or Poles or Ukrainians who stand 
aside, themselves oblique, the third-party witnesses.32 The test-case 
drama of human good and evil lies in the attentiveness of these by-
standers, and the case leans towards evil in those who chose not to 
know, who literally and metaphorically turned away, averted their 
gaze. Claude Lanzmann in Shoah has his camera stare down, relent-
lessly, unturning, on the local inhabitants near Treblinka such as 
Czeslaw Borowi, who saw nothing, as the passage of the trains or the 
crematorium smoke seemingly left no trace. Levi also talks bitterly of 
the ordinary Germans who conveniently “knew nothing”, had no 
inkling, “keine Ahnung” (in Se questo è un uomo and again in “Vana-
dio” in Il sistema periodico – 1975).33 And Levi staged their indifference 
not fear it because they are too tired to comprehend it. They populate my memory 
with their faceless presence, and if I could capture in a single image all the evil of 
our time, I would choose this one, which I know so well: a bony figure of a man, 
his forehead hanging low, his shoulders bent over, with not a trace of thought on 
his face or in his eyes.” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 86. 
32  Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders. The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945, 
London, Lime Tree, 1992. 
33  P. Levi, Opere, cit., respectively vol. 1, p. 110 and vol. 1, p. 931. 
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as a fundamental, terrible post-war legacy for Germany and for hu-
manity in one of the most telling scenes in La tregua (1963), when he 
finds himself in Munich staring at crowds of cowed former citizens of 
the Reich – once again, looking for a face, a look, a turn, an ear: “mi 
sembrava che ognuno avrebbe dovuto interrogarci, leggerci in viso 
chi eravamo e ascoltare in umiltà il nostro racconto. Ma nessuno ci 
guardava negli occhi, nessuno accettò la contesa: erano sordi, ciechi e 
muti.”34 This moment comes near the end of the La tregua, and it is 
the seed of a far greater intuition that Levi says struck him in the ear-
ly 1960s as he was writing La tregua and was articulated with full 
force in I sommersi e i salvati; the intuition that the Germans, perhaps 
especially these Germans, the Germans as bystanders, were his true 
readers, his book aimed at them like a gun: 
 
Da soverchiatori, o da spettatori indifferenti, sarebbero diventati letto-
ri: li avrei costretti, legati davanti ad uno specchio. Era venuta l’ora di 
fare i conti, di abbassare le carte sul tavolo. Soprattutto, l’ora del col-
loquio. La vendetta non mi interessava; ero stato intimamente soddi-
sfatto dalla (simbolica, incompleta, tendenziosa) sacra rappresenta-
zione di Norimberga, ma mi stava bene così, che alle giustissime 
impiccagioni pensassero gli altri, i professionisti. A me spettava capi-
re, capirli. Non il manipolo dei grandi colpevoli, ma loro, il popolo, 
quelli che avevo visti da vicino, quelli tra cui erano stati reclutati i mi-
liti delle SS, ed anche quegli altri, quelli che avevano creduto, che non 
credendo avevano taciuto, che non avevano avuto il gracile coraggio 
di guardarci negli occhi, di gettarci un pezzo di pane, di mormorare 
una parola umana.35 
34  “I thought that each one of them should have asked us questions, should have read 
into our faces who we were and listened in humility to our story. But no-one 
looked us in the eye, no-one took on the challenge: they were deaf, dumb and 
blind” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 393. 
35  “From oppressors or indifferent spectators, now they would become readers: I would 
force them, tie them down before a mirror. It was time for a reckoning, to put our 
cards on the table. Above all, it was time for dialogue. I was not interested in 
revenge; I had been deeply satisfied by the symbolic, incomplete, tendentious, sacred 
drama at Nuremberg, but I was happy also that the entirely just execution had be 
carried out by others, by professionals. My task was to understand, to understand 
them. Not the handful of the great guilty leaders, but the others, the people, the ones 
I had seen close at hand, the ones recruited from the ranks of the SS, and those others 
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Levi’s vocabulary here descends in a direct line from his persistent 
evocation in Se questo è un uomo of dynamics of mirroring, moral ac-
countability, dialogue and exchange, looks and human acknowl-
edgement, the absence of which, the neglect of which in the bystand-
er who is called upon to decide between doing something and doing 
nothing, amounts to a form of evil. 
At this point, we can return to the poem “Shemà” and to what I 
called above its “contractarian” nature: the oath, the law, the word, 
and the curse of disobedience. ‘If you do not look, do not listen, do 
not consider, do not remember, then may others not look, not listen, 
not consider you in your suffering’, the poem seems to say. It is a sort 
of profound contrappasso, a punishment for the evil of human di-
sattention. We might extend this to say that the same evil, the same 
disattention to what constitutes the human, in some analogous way 
produced the image of evil that is the absolute disattention of the 
Muselmann, “l’uomo senza volto”: faceless, without the means to at-
tend to the world, blind, deaf, mute, in an uncanny echo of the citi-
zens of Munich Levi came across in 1945. 
One term captures especially well and binds together all these pat-
terns of disattention, these images of a relational human evil in Levi’s 
writing, and indeed the whole underlying edifice of human failing 
that made the Holocaust possible: the term is a simple one, one that 
has occurred more than once already in the discussion thus far in-
cluding in his characterization of the ordinary Germans of the 1930s 
and 1940s as spectators quoted above: indifference. 
One of the most compelling of all recent philosophical reflections 
on the Shoah was political theorist Norman Geras’s essay of 1998, The 
Contract of Mutual Indifference.36 In his essay, Geras quotes Levi re-
peatedly, including several of the loci we have been citing and ex-
ploring here (“it is enough not to see, not to listen, not to act”), along 
with Elie Wiesel, Adina Szwajger, Aaron Landua and a rich series of 
other survivor and witness voices, all of whom lament the vast 
imbalance between impossible suffering in the camps and the peace-
ful normality of lives lived in its vicinity. Geras quotes historian Ian 
too, who had believed, or who had not believed but had stayed silent, who had not 
shown the frail courage needed to look us in the eyes, to toss us a scrap of bread, to 
mumble a word of human compassion.” Ivi, vol. 2, p. 1125. 
36  Norman Geras, The Contract of Mutual Indifference, London, Verso, 1988. 
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Kershaw’s epigrammatic declaration, “The road to Auschwitz was 
built by hate but paved with indifference”; and sociologist Rainer C. 
Baum’s bold essay “Holocaust: Moral Indifference as The Form of 
Modern Evil”.37 What I am proposing here, ultimately, is that Levi 
guides us to a nuanced understanding of and warning about the 
modern inflection of the universal evil of indifference. As Geras’s title 
indicates, he sees in the Holocaust a contractarian degradation of the 
“social contract”, describing and modelling a prevalent new “con-
tract”, one that undermines all sense of polity and reciprocity, of bal-
ances of rights and duties in the Rousseauian contractarian tradition, 
and one that still pertain powerfully today. The Nazi Final Solution, 
Geras proposes, flourished on the following brutally pragmatic alter-
native “contract of mutual indifference”: “if you do not come to the 
aid of others who are under grave assault, in acute danger or crying 
need, you cannot reasonably expect others to come to your aid in 
similar emergency; you cannot consider them so obligated to you.”38 
In the light of a lucid set of reflections such as these, the profound 
importance of the contractarian oaths and curses of “Shemà”, its 
piercing and shocking focus on the victim and the bystander / reader 
to the exclusion of the perpetrator, become a little clearer. The con-
tract of mutual indifference elevates the Holocaust bystander, 
Czeslaw Borowi and his like, to the level of an ethical norm that sets 
us ‘on the edge of a moral abyss’, as Geras puts it.39 Both Geras and 
Levi understand that the bystander figure represents the stable 
ground of human and social relations against which the unicum of the 
genocide, the terrible dance of perpetrator and victim, is set in train. 
If we revisit some of the sites of Levi’s staging of the look and the 
turn, the markers of the neglect of human mutuality, it is striking that 
the terminology of indifference is regularly present. To give a sample: 
the Muselmann’s condition, seen in the figure of Null Achtzehn, is 
described as a form of essential indifference: “tutto gli è a tal segno 
37  Ivi, p. 18-19. The references are to Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent 
in the Third Reich, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 277; Rainer C. Baum, 
Holocaust: Moral Indifference as The Form of Modern Evil, in Echoes from the Holocaust, 
ed. by Alan Rosenberg and Gerald E. Myers, Philadelphia, Temple University 
Press, 1988, p. 53-90. 
38  N. Geras, The Contract of Mutual Indifference, cit., p. 28. 
39  Ivi, p. 77. 
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indifferente […] alla morte ci andrà con questa stessa totale indiffer-
enza.”40 Similarly, the air raids in the skies near Monowitz leave the 
inmates indifferent, as one death looks much the same as another, 
both met “con immutata indifferenza: non era rassegnazione cosci-
ente, ma il torpore opaco delle bestie domate con le percosse, a cui 
non dolgono più le percosse.”41 In this case, the analogy with ani-
mals, with a pre-moral or pre-conscious state of mind is of a piece 
with a vision of humanity as the capacity feel one’s own and others’ 
pain. The SS are indifferent in their way also: like Pannwitz, they do not 
see and this is a mark of their climactic success in enacting moral violence 
to the category of the human (of their evil): “ai piedi della forca, le SS ci 
guardano passare con occhi indifferenti: la loro opera è compiuta.”42 
Finally and conversely, however, in quite another moment of his 
work, Levi posits an opposite, positive model of non-indifference 
(which equates with difference, discrimination, but also attention and 
recognition), explicitly given as the governing (ethical) principle of 
his work as a scientist and more broadly for his engagement with the 
human and moral matter of the world: 
  
Ho contratto dal mio mestiere un’abitudine che può essere variamen-
te giudicata, e definita a piacere umana o disumana, quella di non ri-
manere mai indifferente ai personaggi che il caso mi porta davanti. 
Sono esseri umani, ma anche “campioni”, esemplari in busta chiusa, 
da riconoscere, analizzare e pesare.43 
 
Indifference is, in other words, both cause and effect of a moral and 
physical death, of the human evil at the root of the Holocaust and its 
40  “Everything is indifferent to him, to such a degree that he will go to his death with 
the same utter indifference.” P. Levi, Opere, cit., vol. 1, p. 37. 
41  “With unyielding indifference: this was not a conscious resignation, but rather the 
opaque torpor of beasts tamed by blows, who no longer feel the pain of the 
blows.” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 114-115. 
42  “Beneath the gallows, they watch us past with indifferent eyes: their work is 
complete.” Ivi, vol. 1, p. 146. 
43  “From my profession I have acquired a habit, which might be variously viewed, 
seen by some as humane and others as inhumane, of never remaining indifferent 
to the characters that chance throws in my path. They are human beings, but also 
‘samples’, secret prototypes, to be recognized, analysed and weighed.” Ivi, vol. 2, 
p. 1101-1102. 
                                                        
3. “…Racchiudere in una immagine tutto il male del nostro tempo.” 77 
modernity. The SS’s and the Germans’ indifference finds a strange and 
complex mirrored refraction in the indifference of the Muselmänner: 
they share an obscure mimetic bond. Both the bystanders and the hol-
low men “do not see, do not listen, do not act”; and both are the proper 
objects of testimony. We could summarize the implication of this for 
Levi’s work thus: he writes of and for the Muselmänner, in his third-
party, proxy voice; and, further, he writes to the bystanders, emblemat-
ically the Germans, or the Poles whom he harangues in the market 
place in La tregua, in a plural act of declamation, transmission and, yes 
also, of potential curse (“Or else…”). He writes along an axis of indif-
ference, as the very essence and condition of modern evil.  
Against the looming threat of indifference, Levi ranges his com-
plex, contrary ethics of attention, a plural dynamics of turning out-
wards and towards, of knowledge and acknowledgement. This is a 
lucid turning, haunted by the shape of that modern evil. It is not an 
evil in the face of God or the radical evil of Kantian tradition, but re-
lational, between humans. It is John Donne’s ‘triumph of evil’ that 
requires merely that “good men do nothing”. To resist it, Geras talks 
of a possible new moral settlement, a generalized “duty to bring aid” 
set against the “contract of mutual indifference”. 44  Absolute self-
sacrifice may be neither possible nor indeed desirable – we would be 
back in the uncomfortable (because not-human) territory of the saint 
– but choosing to see, giving credence to the possibility of aid, look-
ing at others “face to face”, perhaps this is possible. This is why, for 
Geras as for Levi, the contract of mutual aid, of human solidarity, is 
signed not in blood or (only) in language, but in the guarantor of the 
face, in the faces of the suffering of others. 
It is no coincidence, perhaps, that the turn of the face is not only 
the mark of indifference, but is also the emblem of another icono-
graphic field, from Adam and Eve’s naked expulsion from Eden on-
wards, the mark of human shame, another great Levian theme. The 
turn of the face as a mark of the “species shame” of being human, 
which Levi describes in some remarkable pages of I sommersi e i salva-
ti,45 is also of course a turn away from our own human capacity for 
evil, which in Levi amounts to our all-too-human capacity not to see. 
44  N. Geras, The Contract of Mutual Indifference, cit., p. 48 and ff. 
45  P. Levi, Opere, cit., vol. 2, p. 1045-1058. 
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